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PANEL II: ICANN AND WIPO AT
WORK: TOWARDS A PARADIGM OF
INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
GOVERNANCE?
PRINCIPAL PAPERS
THE MANAGING LAWMAKER IN
CYBERSPACE:
A POWER MODEL
Tamar Frankel *
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about power — the ability to gain obedience
whether by captivating followers, persuading skeptics or
awarding and withdrawing economic benefits. The purpose of
this Article is to analyze how the power of the Internet Corporation for Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) was created, augmented, strengthened and reined in. Many controversies surround ICANN, including the very foundation of its existence —
the need for a single “root” in the Internet naming infrastructure — its organizational form and accountability, and the
utterances, policies and actions of its management.
The purpose of this Article is not to argue and prescribe but
to describe and explain. Description, however, is rarely, if ever,
neutral. This Article is no exception. The author is biased in
favor of the ICANN experiment. I hope it matures to become a
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I owe many of the
clarifications in this Article to comments of David Johnson; Kenneth A. Cukier, a journalist who is currently writing a book about the Internet Corporation for Names and Numbers; and Professor Michael Meurer of Boston University School of Law.
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model for a global organization — with a limited mission,
grounded in a unique type of consensus, and operated in a special kind of balance of power environment. I hope that ICANN’s
processes and activities will reflect the spirit of the Internet
that it influences. I hope that it will exercise its power only to
address problems when they arise, and nurture innovation
whenever possible. I hope that the Internet community and
ICANN will follow the “rule of consensus” just as civil societies
follow the rule of law. Events in the past month are perhaps
bringing the issues to a head, but at this stage my crystal ball
is dim and hope reigns supreme.
ICANN operates in a dual capacity: as a manager and a
lawmaker. It provides high-level manageme nt of some of the
Internet’s operational infrastructure. I use the term management in a very broad sense. ICANN neither operates nor fully
controls any of the actors that constitute the Internet’s infrastructure. It has, however, power, in varied degrees, to direct
these actors.1 For lack of a better word, I call this direction
“managing.” In addition, ICANN establishes some of the Internet’s constitutive rules that facilitate universal connectivity.2 It
has used its power to determine the process under which new
top-level domain names (“TLDs”) are allocated. To this extent it
is a lawmaker.
The inquiry into ICANN is important because ICANN plays
a significant role in the operation of the Internet. The inquiry
is interesting because, like the Internet, ICANN has no precise
analog.3 The inquiry is difficult because the location and iden1. ICANN’s power over the Internet service providers (“ISPs”) is minimal, and depends on their consensus of using a single root. Its power over the
registries of most country code top-level domain names is limited, but it can
exert more pressure on registries of generic top-level domain names. See infra
Part II.A.1-2.
2. ICANN plays a lesser role with respect to ISPs. Large ISPs can decide
whether to point at the ICANN root. They have no contractual obligation to
follow ICANN’s policies, or otherwise interact with ICANN except in connection with the allocation of intellectual property blocks.
3. Some international organizations, such as the International Olympic
Commission and the Diamond Exchange, have arisen not by the support of
governments or laws, but through the initiative of participants. Similar initiatives have given rise to national organizations, such as stock exchanges,
trade organizations and professional associations. However, they differ from
ICANN in a number of important aspects. They were organized directly by
the interested parties; their purpose of organization was usually quite spe-
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tity of ICANN’s power is murky, contradictory and confusing.
Its power structure is fashioned after a private not-for-profit
corporation, but it does not operate an enterprise that such a
corporation usually operates, like a museum, hospital or a
membership organization of credit card issuers. ICANN’s operations involve an enigma — the Internet — which defies a
clear analogy. The Internet has been defined as: a new world
community; the foundation of democracy; a communication system; a form of commerce; a network of networks; and a novel
technology. Each definition brings an analogy to relationships
and power structures. It has been suggested that new technologies undergo a process of chaos and finally settle at something close to familiar models, with some adjustments.4 I believe that this thesis is correct, and that what we see today is a
stage in the evolutionary process of the Internet and its infrastructure. However, the road to the ultimate adjusted model
may determine its choice. The road to ICANN’s final model
may be less bumpy if the model reflects the characteristics of
the Internet. I believe that the Internet is closer to a market.
Therefore, I analogize ICANN to a manager of a unique type of
market.
The use of the market image for the Internet and its infrastructure may seem counterintuitive. More often, ICANN’s image is drawn from the store of political metaphors as a global
government, and its users as citizens; the relationship among
users, service providers and ICANN is thereby grounded in a
“social contract.” Markets and political units share some features. Both require an infrastructure and an implicit agreement — a consensus — among most actors as to the fundame ntal “rules of the game.” Mainly, these rules are born of a rule of
consensus, which people follow even if they are free not to do
so. A “social contract” governs many aspects of our lives, and
so do the markets on which we draw for the essentials for living and for earning our livelihood. The distinction, therefore,
between the two is not in impact but perhaps in the enforcement power. The markets’ coercive powers are more limited.
Yet concern for the integrity of the system (whether the politicific (such as the Olympic games) or for the purpose of regulating their members, and most national organizations are regulated by governments, who
serve as backup regulators.
4. See DEBORA L. S PAR , RULING THE WAVES 11-22 (2001).
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cal or econo mic system) drives many dissenters on details to
adhere to the ge neral rules of the majority. It seems that the
main difference is in the kinds of enforcement tools that markets can use. In that respect, ICANN’s enforcement tools resemble those of the markets and not those of the political units.
I believe that even though ICANN’s objectives and powers
have not yet been fully defined, its analog is closer to the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”) than to a civil society.
ICANN’s foundation is grounded in technical and business
practices, the objectives of its social contract are limited, and it
lacks coercive state power. Therefore, I stick to my market
model. But because the Internet affects social interaction, and
because it is evolving, I admit to ICANN’s political undertones.5
Perhaps because of ICANN’s political aspects, the Internet
market and ICANN differ from the securities markets and
their managing lawmakers. ICANN and the actors constituting
the infrastructure of the Internet are essentially unregulated.6
Their accountability to a “higher authority,” such as the De5. I do not analogize ICANN to the United Nations or its organizations,
first because UN membership is usually limited to political units, while
ICANN was explicitly designed to exclude the control, though not the influence, of such units. In addition, the UN’s decisions can be backed by force,
while it is doubtful whether ICANN’s will ever have such a backing. See
NANCY C.M. H ARTSOCK, M ONEY, S EX, AND POWER 55 (1983) (dealing with economic markets, noting the disparities among the actors and arguing that the
market model legitimizes domination by the strong actors over the weaker
actors). ICANN can be analogized to the NYSE. Both institutions act as a
focal point and as a synthesizer among the disparate parts that constitute the
infrastructure of a system. Both pass rules affecting the infrastructure of the
markets. ICANN deals with the domain name registries and the registrars,
and to some extent influences the ISPs. The NYSE deals with the underwriters, brokers and dealers. Both Internet actors and securities market actors
operate independently, some for profit and some not for profit. Both the
NYSE and ICANN combine management and lawmaking. Both have a board
of directors, officers and employees who carry out institutional functions.
Both are in the public eye, for all to see and judge. Like the New York brokers
who gathered on the curb in the late eighteenth century, ICANN’s creators
started by interacting and searching for a network communication unlimited
by subject matter and purposes.
6. ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation incorporated under the laws of
California. However, the regulatory scope of both laws and enforcers of laws
is very limited. See ICANN, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION (1998), available at
http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm
[hereinafter
ARTS.
OF
INCORPORATION].
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partment of Commerce (“DOC”), is unclear. Even the authority
of the DOC is subject to queries. Moreover, ICANN functions
partly as a policy setting institution, partly as a platform for
negotiation and mediation. ICANN has not yet reached maturity, and is likely to operate in a state of flexible adjustment for
some time to come. Recent events suggest that the state of flux
may also turn into a state of shocks, counter shocks, restructure and substitution.
ICANN poses a number of puzzles. First, it is essentially an
unregulated and undemocratic natural monopoly. It is managing and making rules for a hierarchical system that, in the
view of experts, cannot be governed by two entities efficiently.
Yet ICANN’s power at its inception was quite weak. How can a
monopoly be weak? Is not a weak monopoly a contradiction in
terms?
Part II of this Article addresses this query. After a brief description of the basic structure of the Internet naming and
numbering system relevant to ICANN’s power, Part II describes the unique circumstances under which ICANN was created to explain its weak initial existence. ICANN’s power was
and remains a default power. There were many candidates for
managing and controlling ICANN’s functions. All vied for the
position. But no candidate agreed that any of the others would
take control of the entity. ICANN’s power stemmed from the
consensus by the parties that none of them would control.
ICANN was not vested with power. It came into being by the
grace of powerful constituencies that refrained from asserting
their power. Hence, ICANN’s weakness.
A second puzzle follows. While ICANN started weak, it has
managed to become far stronger. How could this weak monopoly become stronger with time? Part III of this Article offers an
answer. ICANN has maintained and strengthened its following
by strongly supporting the stability of the Internet (standardizing the infrastructure). This prime directive of maintaining
stability is of great concern to almost everyone around the
globe. In addition, ICANN’s staff has taken special care to ensure that none of the potential claimants to ICANN’s control
would be sufficiently displeased to attempt to wrench control
over it. The staff solved problems through mediation. Other
events and external parties helped. ICANN has flexed its muscles in exercising the powers clearly vested in it, that is, allocating the valuable right to operate TLDs. ICANN has aug-
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mented its power through a stable and able management, including the preparation of its contracts, which contain significant powers. This staff has steered ICANN through the turbulent waters of complex international and national laws, supervised its statements and negotiated on its behalf. Part III of
this Article offers a few examples that demonstrate ICANN’s
rising power.
However, in the past month, ICANN’s staff proposed to restructure the institution. The new structure would eliminate
some of the constraints under which the staff was operating,
expand the staff and offer more powerful positions to constituents that would finance ICANN and its expansion.7 The proposal would establish tighter control and greater power for
ICANN and its staff, a self-perpetuating board representing
the strong constituencies with vested interests in the Internet
and lower input by the unorganized public.
The proposal seems to have been approved by some constituencies, but has prompted protests by others and raised questions in Congress (although ICANN’s restructure is not one of
the main topics in Congress today). The result of these protests
is unclear. Short-term, the staff may ignore them: the proposal
may be a basis for negotiation and some “softening.” Long–
term, if controls tighten and public input shrinks, some predict
a cessation of some parts of the infrastructure and perhaps a
temporary split of the Internet.8 These developments support
the e xplanation of ICANN’s rising powers.
A third puzzle that ICANN poses relates to its current
status. While it has flexed its muscles and become stronger, its
exercise of power has been fairly contained. Since ICANN is a
natural monopoly that has become stronger with time, what
has prevented it in the past, and what prevents it today, from
taking a far more high-handed and extensive ruling posture?
Part IV of this Article deals with this question. The eme rgence of ICANN, its staying power, and the limitations on the
exercise of its power can be partly explained by an analogy to
7. See ICANN, PRESIDENT’S REPORT: ICANN – THE CASE FOR REFORM
(2002), at http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm
[hereinafter P RESIDENT’S REPORT].
8. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 181-82 (2000)
[hereinafter Wrong Turn].
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the economic theory of “contestable markets.”9 The theory deals
with price. I equate price to power. High prices denote a high
level of power. Low prices denote a lower level of power. The
theory of contestable markets suggests that in some cases a
monopolist (or an oligopolist) will charge the low price it would
have charged had the market been competitive. These are the
cases in which the monopolist is more efficient than its potential competitors, and can therefore sell or service at lower
prices. At these prices, the less efficient competitors would not
enter the market.10

9. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE M ARKETS AND THE THEORY
S TRUCTURE 5 (1982). The authors state:

OF INDUSTRY

We define a perfectly contestable market as one that is accessible to
potential entrants and has the following two properties: First, the
potential entrants can, without restriction, serve the same market
demands and use the same productive techniques as those available
to the incumbent firms. Thus, there are no entry barriers in the
sense of the term used by Stigler. Second, the potential entrants
evaluate the profitability of entry at the incumbent firms’ pre-entry
prices. That is, although the potential entrants recognize that an expansion of industry outputs leads to lower prices — in accord with
the market demand curves — the entrants nevertheless assume that
if they undercut incumbents’ prices they can sell as much of the corresponding good as the quantity demanded by the market at their
own prices.
Id. “Stigler defines an entry barrier to be present when the potential entrants
face costs greater than those incurred [by the incumbent].” Id.
10. For example, if one airline provides an optimal service between two
towns (e.g., twice a week), and charges a price that allows it minimal profits,
no competing airline will choose the same route. Another example is traditional securities underwriting, which involves high risks and requires very
high investment and a distribution system. Smaller broker-dealers did not
enter this market because they could not compete with the very large underwriters on price and reliable performance. Among the underwriters there
exists an apex structure. In 1983, the structure was predicted to continue,
and it seems in 2001 that it has. See S AMUEL L. HAYES III ET AL ., COMPETITION
IN THE INVESTMENT B ANKING INDUSTRY 72-73, 76 (1983). The authors note
research which suggests that “investment banking has long tended to assume
a pyramidal competitive structure, with a few preeminent firms providing
leadership in both financing and collateral services” and a tendency towards
increased concentration. Id. at 78. Nonetheless, the authors argue that this
structure “masks a competitive structure” because the markets are segmented. Id. “[C]ertain types of clients and industries tend to gravitate towards [certain types of investment bankers].” Id. at 79.
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Yet the monopolist will not raise the prices in contestable
markets. In these markets, entry costs for potential competitors would not be higher than the entry costs for the monopolist.11 For example, the cost of airplanes for two airlines will be
close, if not identical. In addition, the exit costs for competitors
would be zero or close to zero.12 Thus, the theory predicts that
competitors will not enter the market only so long as they cannot afford to charge the monopolist’s low prices. If, however,
the monopolist charges higher prices, competitors will enter the
market to offer the same service at the same prices or lower.
When prices fall, these competitors will pocket their profits and
exit the markets. This theory suggests that the “potential or
threatened competition of possible new competitors” presents a
great constraining force.13 Potential competition will “extend
the beneficent sway of the invisible hand” that leads the market.14
The theory of contestable markets highlights a special “balance of power” and its restraining effect. I believe that a similar idea of a contestable market helps understand ICANN’s
environment. To be sure, while its institutional structure is
still evolving, ICANN’s existence and activities are based on a
consensus among numerous power holders. More importantly,
the large Internet service providers’ (“ISPs”) consensus to use a
single root constitutes the foundation of ICANN’s power. Most
importantly, the tugging pressure of “path dependence” in the
case of ICANN is very great. It costs to change legacy-systems.
A move by some and not by other participants of the infrastruc11. See BAUMOL , supra note 9, at 7 (stating the airline industry as an example).
12. For example, an airline can exit a route with little cost by redirecting
its planes to another route.
13. BAUMOL , supra note 9, at 13.
14. The theory of contestable markets has led to the deregulation of the
airlines, among others. Deregulation, however, demonstrated the flaws in the
theory’s predictions. The correct monopolistic or competitive price absent
actual competition is controversial. Entry barriers defined as “sunken costs”
are difficult to determine. It was discovered that exit involves transaction
costs. Further, there is a price lag that provides insufficient after-entry profits for the entering competitors during the “hit-and-run” period. All these
issues require correction, but judicial or government correction increases
costs, and small corrections may result in far larger deviations. Thus, application of the theory is far from perfect. See WILLIAM B. T YE , T HE T HEORY OF
CONTESTABLE M ARKETS (1990) (listing a number of flaws in the theory).
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ture may endanger the universality and integrity of the Internet. Even a slight move may generate a slippery slope towards
disorder and unpredictability. The beneficent principle of “the
devil you know” engenders an almost knee-jerk reaction in this
case. Nonetheless, I believe that the need for one guiding hand
— a natural monopoly, on the one hand, and the ability of some
players to overthrow ICANN or particular actions of ICANN, as
illuminated by the theory of contestable markets — limits
ICANN’s exercise of power.
The recent proposal to restructure ICANN supports the thesis of this Article.15 Under the proposal, public representation
on ICANN’s board has been eliminated. Five of the nine directors’ seats reserved for representatives of the public were allocated to representatives of governments — each seat to be occupied by a representative of a world region.16 Arguably, the
governments are the effective representatives of the people.17
Each of the other representations will be selected by a particular powerful constituency. One reason for the change seems to
be ICANN’s management’s concern with ICANN’s financing.
Specifically, the management desired to finance the expansion
of ICANN’s activities and its staff. The governments will finance, but obtain a stronger voice in ICANN’s governing body.
It seems that the European Union will also gain ICANN’s support for its new country code top-level domain name (“ccTLD”),
“.eu,” as an exception to the practice that only United Nationsrecognized countries be awarded this type of name. Thus, the
potential competitors of ICANN joined it and presumably
would compete or negotiate inside rather than outside the organization. A consensus among the constituents will make
ICANN a very strong monopoly because the ranks of the constraining outside forces will dwindle. That development may
ultimately pose a danger to the integrity of the Internet. A
strong and authoritarian ICANN may become a true regulator
that departs from the spirit and loose structure of the Internet.
That may press dissidents to combine, build and offer an alternative, which is technically feasible even today. Today, such an
15. See P RESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 7.
16. Id.
17. Governments were excluded from the board under the current structure. They did, however, participate as an advisory committee. The proposed
restructure would include government representatives as directors.
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alternative does not draw members of the infrastructure. If
ICANN tightens the reins sufficiently to strengthen the dissidents, an alternative will gain followers, or the dissidents may
gain control, “capture” ICANN, and the experiment will continue.
A less prominent aspect of the contestable markets theory is
the interest of all competing parties in maintaining a viable
market. If competition drives the consumers away altogether,
or destroys the market structure, the competitors have nothing
to compete for.18 One of the main objectives of the parties interested in the Internet is to ensure a thriving Internet. Control
by itself is insufficient unless the Internet is preserved. The
binding force of all parties today is the belief that the Internet
will not survive unless it has a single root. Parties with a stake
in the continued operation of the Internet are very reluctant to
enter into a competing structure that may endanger the Internet’s inter-operability. This is the glue that holds all participants together. On this issue the rule of consensus is imperative. But if a new technology develops in which one or more
alternative roots do not disrupt the smooth operation of the
Internet, then ICANN’s power will become meaningless or far
weaker than its controllers currently aim. They will then grasp
at nothing, just as they cannot grasp today at some parts of the
Internet’s infrastructure that are not dependent on the single
root concept. Even though the probability that this alternative
will be effective seems very low, its effect is drastic. Therefore,
pressure to develop and build alternatives to the single root
may be another constraining element in the Internet power
market.
This Article concludes that ICANN’s power is still being
shaped. It could emerge along a market model, as a central
catalyst for consensus building among parties with different
interests. ICANN would address problems as they arise. This
model would also be closer to the model that the technical
community follows, although money is not its mover. In a previous draft of this Article, I suggested that “[a]lternatively,
ICANN could also move towards a more regulatory model
18. Thus, competitors will not use violence to compete (plant bombs at
each other’s shops) because the marketplace becomes too dangerous to visit
and consumers will avoid all shops.
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based on the consensus of powerful constituencies who have a
significant stake in ICANN.” It seems that the current restructuring attempt of ICANN’s management moves toward this
model. Or ICANN can combine the two models to form a more
structured market and more flexible regulatory body. Or none
of these governance models would make a difference. A new
ICANN, an alternative system or no system may rise by a
technology that is today a mere twinkle in someone’s eye.
II. A PUZZLE: H OW CAN A NATURAL MONOPOLY B E WEAK?
A. ICANN Manages a Hierarchical System that Is a Natural
Monopoly
As everyone knows, the Internet can be viewed as a network
of networks free of central control and led by an “invisible
hand.” That is true to an extent, just as markets can be viewed
as interactions among individuals and groups free of central
control. To this extent, both systems are led by an invisible
hand. Both, however, cannot function without an infrastructure.19 Put in biblical terms, without a common language, both
systems can become a dysfunctional Tower of Babel. The current Internet network structure requires that each receiver and
sender of messages will have a unique one -of-a-kind designation, and that each computer message will have a unique number so that the “packages” of transported information will reach
their destination.20 The design further requires that transmissions be go verned by acceptable protocols. If receivers, senders
or spaces do not have unique designations and if the actors
serving as the infrastructure do not follow the protocols, messages will miss their destinations. The Internet will become the
Tower of Babel.21
19. See Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of
Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV . 389 (1993).
20. See, e.g., Milton Mueller, Technology and Institutional Innovation:
Internet Domain Names, 5 INT’ L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2000), available at
LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File.
21. See INTERNET ARCHITECTURE BOARD , TECHNICAL COMMENT ON THE
UNIQUE DNS ROOT (1999), at http://www.icann.org/correspondence/iab-techcomment-27sept99.htm (stating that information emphasizing the current
one root should remain intact to avoid confusion within the Internet community); James Middleton, Icann Tackles “Alternative” Domain Names,
V NUNET. COM (June 1, 2001), at http://www.vnunet.com/News/1122310 (The
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1. The Feudal Structure of the Naming and Numbering System
With a view to preventing chaos and ensuring stability, the
Internet naming and numbering system was designed in a hierarchical mode. Each level contains a signifier, under which
names and numbers within its sphere of influence are recorded.
The single root or dot (“.”) is in fact a database for two letter
country code domain names such as “.uk” (United Kingdom) or
“.fr” (France). The single root zone also contains generic toplevel domain names (“gTLDs”), such as “.com,” “.org,” “.gov”
and “.edu.”22 That system ensures, for example, that no other
“.edu” exists. Listed under the “.edu” umbrella are Boston University and other educational institutions. No other Boston
University can be listed. Under the name of each institution,
other lower level domain names can be listed and managed,
such as “tfrankel.” No other “tfrankel” can be listed.
There is a general belief that the inter-connectivity of the
Internet depends on the integrity and maintenance of this hierarchical structure, and that unless the message senders and
transferors comply with the same rules, or protocols, confusion
will reign. Hence, like market standards of weights and measures and prohibitions on fraud, the Internet is governed by a
structure of names, numbers and protocols.23

author notes “rogue domains” and that “ICANN plans to set up an oversight
panel to take a firm stance against the alternative movement, claiming that
there are ‘solid technical grounds for a single authoritative root.’”). The report
describes the arguments and explanations for the emergence of these rogue
alternative roots. See InterNIC, The Domain Name System: A Non-Technical
Explanation — Why Universal Resolvability Is Important, at
http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2002).
22. JON POSTEL , D OMAIN N AME S YSTEM S TRUCTURE AND DELEGATION 1
(1994), at ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt (describing the domain name
system). On the arguments on whether new gTLDs should be added, see
ICANN, REPORT (PART ONE ) OF WORKING GROUP C (NEW GTLDS) P RESENTED
TO
NAMES COUNCIL (2000), at http://www.icann.org/dnso/wgc-report21mar00.htm; ICANN, S UPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO NAMES COUNCIL
CONCERNING WORKING G ROUP C (2000), at http://www.icann.org/dnso/wgcsupp-report-17apr00.htm; ICANN, CONSIDERATION OF INTRODUCING NEW
GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS (2000), at http://www.icann.org/dnso/gtld-topic20apr00.htm.
23. To be sure, there are networks, and very large networks, that have
different names, numbers and protocols. But if they are to interconnect with
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The intermediaries that form the Internet infrastructure are
the ISPs, registries and registrars. ISPs receive and transfer
messages usually to other ISPs and through them to the final
destination.24 Registries manage the database of the names
under their umbrella in the pyramid. Thus, the “root registry”
registers the ccTLDs and gTLDs.25 Registries manage and publish the zone files of ccTLDs and gTLDs. Registrars manage
names under specific gTLDs. The current uniform practice
among the large ISPs is to follow the single root structure.
Some people question the necessity of one root and maintain
that dual roots will not necessarily disrupt the connectivity of
the Internet.26 But no one has made a serious attempt to experiment with two roots for fear of disrupting the smooth operation of the Internet.
2. The Power of Bestowing Internet Names and Numbers
An Internet “domain name” differs in value and function
from a name in real space.27 A domain name is the spark that
breathes life and the very existence on the Internet. The loss of
a name on the Internet is death without a trace. In fact, when
reassigned, the name breathes life into another being. Our
Internet names must be unique to us. More than in real space,
the Internet name system deprives us of the freedom to use the
names allocated to others. While in real space people with the
same name can be distinguished by other means, on the Internet there is little distinguishing information about people.

the global network, they must fit within the naming, numbering and protocols of the global Internet.
24. In addition, there are services that do not actually transfer the messages but facilitate the search for particular sites on the Internet, such as
America Online.
25. DOMAIN NAME S ERVICES O RGANIZATION , ROOT LEVEL REGISTRY R ULES,
THE M ANNER OF ADDING NEW GTLDS TO THE INTERNET (1999), at
http://www.dnso.net/mhsc-tld.htm (“The function of the root registry is to
register and advertise TLDs.”).
26. See Kieren McCarthy, The Insider’s Guide to the ICANN Meeting,
REGISTER (Sept. 21, 2001), at http://theregister.co.uk/content/6/21533.html
(noting that “some within ICANN” have supported multiple roots).
27. See Tamar Frankel, The Common Law and Cyberspace (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Journal).
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Names are the only means of recognition.28 Therefore, name
allocation and withdrawal can be a source of power and wealth.
Like the naming system, the management of the system is
hierarchical, and so is the power to allocate names. Since all
names derive from one source, that source reigns supreme, and
like the vassals in the feudal system, each vassal source derives its power from the lord above it, until it reaches the pinnacle — the king. That king is ICANN.
3. Enter ICANN
ICANN was established to achieve a number of objectives.
The foremost objective was to ensure the Internet stability and
expand its capacity. ICANN was also required to increase the
number of gTLDs and registries, to facilitate competition
among them,29 and to help establish a dispute settlement
mechanism between holders of domain names and holders of
registered trademarks.30 The precise nature of ICANN’s authority was not spelled out. Some viewed it as a forum for de28. Because short names help memory, they are in short supply. Although
we view the Internet as a source of new and more information, often the details are lost on Internet communications. For example, we can receive information quickly from all over the globe. But information about the senders
and receivers is more limited than in face-to-face or even telephone interaction. As one dog in front of the computer says to another in a cartoon in the
New Yorker: “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.” Peter Steiner,
NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61, 61.
29. See ICANN Announces Decision on .com/.net/.org Domains,
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW ., June 2001, at 31 (describing the revised agreement between ICANN and the registry of “.com,” “.org” and “.net,” that
VeriSign had acquired the registry and that Network Solutions, Inc. has been
split, thus facilitating competition on the registry level); Sandra Dillich, Network Solutions Loses .com, .net and .org, COMPUTER DEALER NEWS, Feb. 25,
2000, at 42 (describing the negotiations that led to the agreement, and the
history and summary of the agreement).
30. See
ICANN
Watch,
ICANN
for
Beginners,
at
http://www.icannwatch.org/icann4beginners.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2002);
Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
Fed. Reg. 8826 (Feb. 20, 1998) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. ch. 13) (proposing a
rule to improve the management of the Internet Domain Name System, and
describing the infrastructure of the Internet). This rule was not passed. Instead, the DOC issued a Statement of Policy in the form of a White Paper,
which stated the main objectives contained in the proposed rule. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10,
1998).
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veloping policy by building a consensus. Some viewed it as a far
more proactive manager of a technology-based market, designed to monitor and evaluate the infrastructure actors of the
naming and numbering system and its performance, as well as
to prevent transgressions that endanger the system.
ICANN’s lawmaking functions include allocation and regulation of some, though not all, lucrative infrastructure services,
such as the registries and registrars,31 and setting the qualifications of these actors.32 ICANN can therefore create such
businesses and limit entry into such businesses. Unlike go vernments, ICANN’s mission is limited to its enterprise. The
enterprise, however, affects many areas of human lives —
business, culture, politics, community, public morals and private rights. Its reach is global. In that sense as well, ICANN is
a lawmaker.
ICANN’s structure is unique, and I may say, unwieldy. It
consists of a board, a president and staff, and three “supporting
organizations,” the most problematic of which is the Domain
Name Supporting Organization (“DNSO”).33 Each organization
nominates three board members, while nine board members
are elected by users. Elections by millions of people over the
globe have not yet been achieved. ICANN’s processes required
31. See Dillich, supra note 29 (noting that registry services “became a
huge revenue maker”). As to ISPs, aside from contracting with Regional
Internet Registries for some policy-making intellectual property address
block allocation, which involves little policy making, there are no qualifications or other regulation of ISPs.
32. See Saroja Ginshankar, Internet Domain Name Registry Up for Bids,
INTERNETWEEK, Feb. 15, 1999, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. The
monitoring and evaluation is to be determined by a committee of third parties. See ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT, M EETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN
S TOCKHOLM
(2001),
at
http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report04jun01.htm (“Whereas in resolution 01.60, the [ICANN] Board directed ‘the
President to prepare and present to the Board . . . a proposal to form a committee to recommend processes for monitoring the implementation of the new
TLDs and evaluating the new TLD program, including any ongoing adjustments of agreements with operators or sponsors of new TLDs.’”).
33. ICANN, Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO), at
http://www.icann.org/dnso/dnso.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). The DNSO
structure does not contain a working group which deals with issues concerning the ccTLDs. For a chart of the ICANN organization, see ICANN Watch,
The ICANN-GAC Organization, at http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/
orgchart.gif (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (ICANN organization chart by Tony
Rutkowski).
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transparency and public participation. This requirement has
not been entirely met. Further, it is unclear whether ICANN
was expected to establish policies or merely to approve policies
established by its three supporting organizations. The DNSO
did not succeed in reaching a consensus on proposed policies.34
In its proposal to restructure ICANN, the staff has declared the
current structure and constraints a failure, and proposed to
simplify the structure.35 Five directors representing the governments of each global region would substitute for the nine
publicly elected directors. No review panel would be established to determine the board’s policy authority. ICANN will
move towards a corporate model of the traditional not-for-profit
corporation vintage.
B. ICANN Emerged as a Weak Monopoly Because of the Circumstances Surrounding Its Creation
Two views explain the creation of ICANN. One view describes ICANN’s creation as the expression of a consensus on a
specific agenda among parties with different interests and
views.36 The other view on the creation of ICANN is also consensus-based.37 But the consensus was about something else.
The interested parties, such as the technical communities, the
large business interests, Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”) (that
managed the root zone and the gTLDs “.com,” “.net” and “.org”),
the various governments, the large ISPs, the small ISPs and
the small businesses that use the Internet, had very different
34. See infra Part III.B.4. describing the disaffection of the ccTLD registries.
35. See P RESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 7.
36. In 1998, prior to ICANN’s creation, the author chaired meetings entitled the International Forum on the White Paper. These meetings were held
in Reston, Virginia, on July 1-2, 1998; Geneva, Switzerland, on July 24-25,
1998; Singapore, on August 11-13, 1998; and Buenos Aires, Argentina, on
August 20-21, 1998. The author spoke to the group in Buenos Aires but did
not chair that meeting. The participants represented many different stakeholders. The purpose of the meetings was to reach a rough consensus regarding the structure, governance and participation of the company that was to
take over the management of the naming and numbering system of the
Internet. The consensus achieved in these meetings contributed to the establishment of ICANN. See Domain Name Handbook, International Forum on
the White Paper (IFWP), at http://www.domainhandbook.com/ifwp.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2002).
37. Id.
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views of what the Internet infrastructure should be and how it
should be managed. Most importantly, they disagreed on who
should have the power to manage the naming system. They
were also very concerned about the possible “capture” of the
naming and numbering system by one interest group. Therefore, their consensus on the issues was reached at a very high
level of generality. The devil of the details was left to be resolved.
1. Power by Default: “I Will Not Claim Control if You Do Not
Claim Control”38
A review of ICANN’s creation and emerging power suggests
that different interest groups agreed not to claim control if everyone else would not claim control of the naming and numbering system. ICANN’s power was therefore created by default.
No one interest group has agreed to put another interest group
on the throne to manage and regulate the infrastructure of the
Internet, and each group was anxious about capture by another.
There were many candidates for the job: (1) the United
States and other governments; (2) the established technical
communities headed by Dr. Jon Postel, who designed the system and managed it for over twenty years; (3) the large businesses; (4) the professionals who sought to participate in the
infrastructure for profit; (5) people who claimed to represent
the consumers or users; and (6) international communication
organizations.
The United States, which triggered the emergence of the
Internet, and the U.S. administration, which exercised the
management power over the Internet naming and numbering
system, did not seek to continue its hegemony. The administration was hard pressed by a number of countries to deAmericanize the Internet. Other difficult political issues have
arisen that the U.S. wished to avoid. For example, how to define a country entitled to a ccTLD, and how to convert into
competition the monopoly position of registries, notably NSI
(now VeriSign), that managed “.com,” “.org” and “.net.” The
U.S. administration was not interested in mediating disputes

38. Id.
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between the business communities and the technical communities, since the solutions involved costs in dollars and time.
The U.S. administration was ready to offer the Internet to
the world, but with strings attached. To de-Americanize the
management and regulation of the Internet infrastructure
without severing its American umbilical cord, the administration considered different avenues. Since the interested groups
did not reach a consensus, the administration conducted meetings and produced a policy paper that seemed, at a high level,
to represent a consensus not only between the U.S. groups, but
also with foreign governments.39
While
different
governments
demanded
the
deAmericanization of the Internet, none claimed to be the sole
governor of the Internet infrastructure. It was recognized that
none would succeed in realizing such a demand, and the only
country which in fact controlled the infrastructure, namely the
U.S., was unlikely to relinquish control to another country.
Neither was the UN an acceptable alternative. Control over the
Internet infrastructure required a nimble guiding management
and sensitive rulemaking. The UN and its various organizations were considered too slow and inflexible to respond to the
kaleidoscopic, fast-changing demands of the Internet.
The technical community, especially the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (“IANA”), led by Dr. Postel, was a natural
candidate for the management of the infrastructure of the
Internet. It had been managing the infrastructure since the
Internet’s inception. Many members of the communities were
in fact the ISPs and registries. They also commanded support
of some European governments. These communities wanted to
undertake the management and regulatory function. However,
the U.S. business community and NSI did not agree to a transfer of control to the technical communities, and demanded a
voice, even a decisive voice, in decisions concerning the Internet infrastructure. Therefore, a compromise between these two
interest groups and their different visions of the Internet had
to be reached before a private corporation could be established.
The conflict between the technical communities and the
business communities was complicated because many had
members in each camp. Some “techies” were employed by large
39. Id.
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business organizations such as MCI (now WorldCom, Inc.),
AT&T Corp. and IBM Corp. These persons were also involved
in the Internet service providing activities. Thus, not all parts
of the business communities necessarily objected to influence of
the technical groups. On the other side of the coin were the registries, and especially NSI, that were publicly owned and operated as businesses rather than as volunteer or scientific enterprises. Thus, it would be more accurate to describe the conflict
as a conflict between two philosophies and cultures. The one
viewed the Internet as a tool for business development or as a
source of profit from servicing. The other, rejecting the view of
the Internet as a tool for “making money,” viewed the Internet
as the product of technological creativity, whose purpose was to
continue to contribute to science, national society and the
global community.40
The small business interests and those who claimed to represent the users and “net citizens” were not candidates for controlling the infrastructure, but demanded participation in the
control.41 They, too, were divided. Some aligned with technical
communities and some with different clusters of interest, but
many did not align with anyone.
It was recognized that technical decisions concerning the infrastructure could no longer be made by technology criteria
alone. Political and business consequences of technical decisions mattered. The future body that would guide the infrastructure of the Internet had to consider all three criteria
(technical, business and political), mediate among them and
balance them correctly. This conclusion brought about the idea
of an entirely new organization to meet the new demands.
The route to establishing the entity that would manage and
regulate the Internet infrastructure had to be foggy. The U.S.
administration wished to avoid “establishing” and “acquiring” a
private corporation because such a corporation must be established under an act of Congress.42 There was concern that if the
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Under federal law, the executive branch may establish and control a
private sector corporation only under a statute. See Government Corporation
Control Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (1994) [hereinafter GCCA]. See also A.
Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L.
REV . 543 (1995) [hereinafter Reinventing Government]. Arguably, because the
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matter came before Congress it might become a problematic
“political football.” To avoid the required act, the administration had to avoid the “establishment” or “acquisition” of such a
corporation. From the point of view of the administration and
some members of Congress, the solution was to help create a
private corporation, grounded in market principles, and an
Internet infrastructure moved by competition. This creation
would be an entity that no one established, but just came into
being. In fact, that is the closest description of the emergence of
ICANN. Not one invisible hand, but many invisible hands,
brought it about. Had only one hand, as invisible as it might
have been, propelled the entity into existence, other powerful
hands would have been raised in protest. The flurry of negotiations, promises, some broken, some re-negotiated or abandoned, and alliances formed and reformed brought about an
equilibrium that allowed the entity to emerge. The driving
force of the negotiation and consensus seems to have been the
recognition that no better alternative was available. ICANN
was therefore born by default.43
2. ICANN’s Initial Power Was Weak
In addition to ICANN’s default creation, it was not very powerful either. The circumstances of its birth did not inspire much
confidence or legitimacy. ICANN had no blessing of an authorizing statute.44 It did not have the benefit of the invisible hand
of the free market or the citizens’ votes in a democratic regime.
In fact, it emerged as a result of negotiations among interest
groups with the service of go-betweens. Its great leadership
weakness was the image of secret negotiations, behind the
executive neither “established” nor “acquired” ICANN, the statute did not
apply to it. ICANN has been operating on the basis of an agreement with the
DOC. The DOC asserts its authority to enter into such agreements, but questions persist.
43. Congress was merely apprised of the emergence of ICANN. The ccTLD
registries are currently paying ICANN a fee for services that they used to
receive free from the U.S. government. It was suggested that they are willing
to do so in order to “pry the Internet naming system from the U.S. government.” Revolt Threatens ICANN’s Budget, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2000), at
http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti821.htm.
44. Under federal law, the executive branch may establish and control a
private sector corporation only under a statute. See GCCA, 31 U.S.C. § 9102.
See also Wrong Turn, supra note 8, at 22-23.
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scenes agreements, and mi strust of “outsiders.” Mistrust
breeds mistrust.
In addition, ICANN’s mandate was general. Some of its missions posed conflicts between technological, business and political views. ICANN was required to establish additional gTLDs.
But the largest corporations with the most famous brand
names objected to any such addition because it imposed heavy
costs on them in protecting their trademarks.45 ICANN was
required to create competition among registries, and especially
to break up NSI’s monopoly. Yet that monopoly was in part
based on the infrastructure of the Interne t that required registries to maintain a central database to avoid duplications of the
names and the numbers. In addition, the “ownership” or other
form of entitlement of the names and the databases was not
established. To create competition among registries and registrars required portability of the names, and demand for names
coupled with the vision of a free market in the names gave the
names the features of property with attendant unanticipated
consequences, such as cybersquatting. Thus, ICANN’s management decisions could have far reaching consequences, and
at the same time conflict with the desires of one or more of its
supporting interest groups.
ICANN received the mantle of Dr. Postel as the manager of
the naming and numbering system. But not quite. It did not
have his authority nor the adoration of his followers, which had
grown with twenty-five years of devoted service and good
judgment. It did, however, have a contract with the DOC, but a
conditional contract at that.46 To become fully vested with the
powers of the United States (whatever these are) over the systems, ICANN had to meet additional conditions under a certain
deadline.47 These involved the heart of its control structure —
45. See Reinventing Government, supra note 42, at 547.
46. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (n.d.),
available at http://www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm (last updated Dec. 31, 1999).
47. ICANN did not meet the requirements of the DOC and was therefore
not fully vested with the authority over the root. However, the DOC has
averred its intention to make the transfer, and retreated from a clear intent.
The question of ICANN’s legal status was discussed in a General Accounting
Office report of 2000. See OFFICE OF THE GE N. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE , DEP’ T OF COMMERCE : RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNET
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public participation in its decision making and in its board.
These conditions were precisely the ones that some of ICANN’s
promoters rejected. Elections are antithetical to selfperpetuating boards. Elections endanger the position of the
existing controlling group and open the doors to capture of the
institution.
In sum, when ICANN emerged, its mission and power were
not clearly defined. Its strength lay in the lack of better alternatives. ICANN’s power was strengthened at the outset by the
highly reputable persons who populated its first board, and by
a dedicated expert staff with significant knowledge of the
Internet, its organizations and its history. This knowledge
complemented the expertise of the board members. Needless to
say, ICANN was not strong. The world sat back, folded its
arms, and took a wait-and-see attitude. ICANN was not powerless, however. It was backed by a number of power centers:
(1) the technical communities; (2) the large business communities, including the large ISPs; (3) NSI; and (4) the involved go vernments. This was ICANN’s power base, and it was quite
broad.48
III. PUZZLE: H OW DOES A WEAK MONOPOLY AUGMENT ITS
POWER ?
A. Consolidating the Power
1. Constitutional Documents: The Articles and Bylaws
ICANN’s articles of incorporation and bylaws have the potential of providing the entity with significant power.49 However,
the entity’s structure is also very complex, and the division of
power among the different groups, such as the board on the one
hand and the supporting organizations on the other hand, is
not spelled out in the document. That is also because there was
no clear consensus on the division of the power. Supporting
CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/0g00033r.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
48. This power base did not include recognized consumer representatives,
except to the extent that national governments may be deemed to represent
the interests of their citizens and residents.
49. See ICANN, BYLAWS (2002), available at http://www.icann.org/general/
bylaws.htm; ARTS. OF INCORPORATIO N, supra note 6.
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organizations could designate their candidates to the board and
could propose policies to the board. Although it seems to have
been the consensus that the board could not reject the candidates, it was not clear whether the board had to accept the policy proposals and whether the board could initiate its own proposals. It was also not clear whether initiation would be limited
to non-technical policies, and whether one could distinguish
between technical, political and business considerations. Thus,
the vagueness of the documents could provide ICANN with
power, or rob it of power, depending on the implementation of
its policies and solutions to the problems with which it would
be presented.
2. The Contracts with Internet Service Providers and
Registries
An important part of ICANN’s power base is grounded in the
contracts that ICANN negotiated with the Internet infrastructure operators, the registries and registrars. These contracts
should rightly be added as part of ICANN’s constitution. Said
ICANN’s President, Mike Roberts: “ICANN had to take the
very informal handshake world of [Internet founder] Jon Postel
and turn that into language that can be written down and form
the basis of a legal arrangement.”50 ICANN sought to formalize
its relationship with the government, the registries and the
service providers through the mechanism of contracts.51
The contracts contain features that empower ICANN. For
example, the parties to the contract are obligated to abide by
ICANN’s policies if these policies command consensus. A review board (to be established) has the authority to make a finding of the existence or absence of a consensus. The importance
of these contracts cannot be exaggerated (because the definition of policy decision is vague). Thus, so long as ICANN’s pol50. Maureen Sirhal, Net Governance: ICANN Makes Progress on Sticky
Issue of Domains, N AT’ L J. TECH. D AILY, Feb. 6, 2001, LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File [hereinafter Sticky Issues]. Such agreements have not yet
materialized with most registries, let alone been standardized. See Maureen
Sirhal, Net Governance: European Domains Want ICANN’s Attention, NAT’L
J. TECH. DAILY, Dec. 7, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File [hereinafter European Domains Want ICANN’s Attention].
51. See Mark Sableman, ICANN Faces Major Challenge with Country
Codes, N AT ’L L.J., Dec. 18, 2000, at C10.
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icy decisions command a consensus they are binding on the
signatories of the contracts, that is, on the actors in the Internet infrastructure.52
Some economists have suggested the use of contracts as a response to the failures of the contestable markets theory, especially in the deregulation period. “The ultimate objective is to
replace transitory regulation with the contracts that would
have been in effect had they not been superseded by regulatory
institutions.”53 Therefore, lawmakers should negotiate laws in
the market, and pass laws that are as close as possible to the
negotiated result had there been a market. The visible regulators’ hand should be led by the visible hand of the parties. The
contestable market theory and the use of contracts are proposed as alternatives to heavy-handed inefficient government
regulation. ICANN is using contracts as a negotiated regulatory device.54
3. General Support for ICANN’s Prime Directive: To Maintain
the Stability of the Internet
ICANN’s primary directive has had the support of many, if
not all, powerful stakeholders. Both governments and businesses that invest millions in Internet commerce and in
persuading their custome rs to use this new medium put a high
premium on stability and operability of the Internet. Blackouts
and other mishaps, even short lived, can cause heavy losses
and terminate client relationships.
The prime directive of ICANN could be interpreted in different ways, some of which allow for more flexibility and experimentation than others. Many questions can be differently determined depending on this interpretation. For example, does
stability require one root at all costs? Can a multitude of roots
52. In the proposed restructure of ICANN, the review board is eliminated.
Conflict on whether a policy commands consensus is then likely to be determined among the parties, a court or other mechanism which the parties will
establish at the time of dispute.
53. TYE , supra note 14, at 121 (suggesting that contracts can be viewed as
an extension of the Coase theorem).
54. See David Johnson & David Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law,
in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds.,
1997).
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be designed in a way that would support stability and increased scope? Should experiments at the fringe of the Internet
be encouraged, and if so, how can they be implemented once
proven not to endanger the stability? Should these experiments
be left to the regulation of the market? If experiments are allowed, to what extent, if any, should enterprises that invested
heavily in existing technology and structure have control over
these experiments? Should these issues be raised now, or
should they be raised when the existing structure is well established? Or, should they be raised when the experiments are
launched, or when problems arise?
With respect to stability of the Internet, ICANN has taken a
conservative attitude, in line with the interpretation of its
stakeholders and many governments. It sought to standardize
the Internet infrastructure. This interpretation strengthens
ICANN’s power. One root creates a natural monopoly that, by
definition, vests decision and lawmaking power in the manager
of the system. Any additional root weakens or completely undermines this power. So long as the main stakeholders view the
prime directive as crucial to their own interests, ICANN must
be endowed with sufficient power to implement this prime objective. That was and has remained a significant basis of
ICANN’s power.
4. Indirect Help From Congress
I believe that even though some members of Congress would
have preferred to deal with Internet governance by legislation
rather than mere monitoring, most members of the House of
Representatives committees that dealt with the Internet were
willing to take the “wait-and-see” attitude towards ICANN.55
However, whether unwittingly or by design, Congress has also
helped ICANN perform a task that seemed impossibly conflicted: creating additional gTLDs and facilitating greater competition among registries. The task met strong opposition from
a large, important stakeholder constituency of ICANN: the
owners of famous trademarks.56 These stakeholders have been
55. The doubts about the legality of ICANN persisted, and Congress requested the General Accounting Office to inquire how ICANN came into existence. See GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 1.
56. See Wrong Turn, supra note 8, at 22-23.
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protecting their trademarks at great cost, and additional
gTLDs could increase these costs because each new gTLD can
breed trademark violations under its cap.
Congress responded to the trademark owners in a way that
reduced their objections to additional gTLDs. Congress passed
a law to protect famous trademarks from dilution.57 This was a
fundamental change in trademark law, which was based on
protection of consumers from confusion. In addition, ICANN
established an option of less expensive resolution of disputes
between trademark owners and domain name owners. The new
statute and the less costly process by which trademark owners
could protect their trademarks against competing domain
names reduced the objection of the large corporations to the
creation of new gTLDs.
In addition, congressional monitoring has helped ICANN by
offering accurate information, criticism and a sense of the limits on ICANN’s actions. For example, when ICANN proposed to
levy a $1 charge on all registrars world-wide for every domain
name registration, the protest, which was aired also in Congress, caused ICANN to back off.58 Some would consider this a
failure. I consider this event a success. Congress helps ICANN
evaluate its trial and error attempts at expanding its power.
5. Help From the Courts
A recent decision regarding a domain name indirectly supports ICANN’s power.59 This case involves a claim by a national
government. The government of South Africa sued an American enterprise that used the words “South Africa” in its domain
names.60 The government of South Africa maintained that the
name is its property.61 The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied jurisdiction and referred the parties to
arbitration in accordance with ICANN’s procedures.62 The deci57. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§
3001-3010, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-521 to -552 (1999) (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 16 & 28 U.S.C.).
58. See Sableman, supra note 51.
59. See Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa, 148 F. Supp. 2d
256 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
60. Id. at 259.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 268.
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sion indirectly supports ICANN’s power. Courts are unlikely to
entertain claims of sovereign powers to ccTLDs, and the issue
is designed to be resolved in accordance with the process established by ICANN. It is unlikely that any and all uses of a
state’s name will be barred by the arbitration tribunal. Thus,
ICANN will be freed of making difficult decisions. It seems that
the government of South Africa and some other governments
have determined to protect their names by internal legislation.63 This approach as well relieves ICANN from the burden
of determining the issue and exposing a weakness if it cannot
implement its decision.
6. Mediation and Negotiations with and Among Stakeholders
ICANN has chosen appropriate methods for consolidating
power. Before decisions were made public, the governments
and other large stakeholders were consulted and a consensus
was obtained. Only then would the results be published. Further, ICANN has not always insisted on exerting authority. It
deals with powerful constituencies by negotiation rather than
ruling. However, every agreement with any such constituency
helps build precedents for agreements with others, thereby
helping to establish future customary rules. Moreover, when a
conflict arose among powerful stakeholders, ICANN was often
inclined to play the role of a mediator rather than an arbitrator. It has provided an effective forum for negotiation and a
face-saving intermediary service. That increased its value to
those participants. Repeat requests to ICANN augmented its
power.
However, consensus-building negotiations make it harder to
gain public support and broad leadership. The process is far
from public and the method limits ICANN’s freedom to factor
in public comments. Therefore, the solicitation of public comments and input seems to be a sham. To some extent it is.
That may explain why ICANN’s power rests primarily on its
constituencies and far less on public support and leadership.

63. See Bill on Internet Due Soon, AFRICA NEWS, Oct. 4, 2001, LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File; Cyber Cops to Ensure Safe Surfing, AFRICA
NEWS, Mar. 22, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (noting that
the bill was tabled in March 2002).
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B. Demonstrating ICANN’s Rising Power
Recent events concerning ccTLDs demonstrate that ICANN’s
power is on the rise. ICANN’s interaction with ccTLD registries
has increased in recent years. The context and substance of
these interactions differ, but all indicate the nature and level of
ICANN’s power.
1. Country Code Top–Level Domain Names
ccTLDs are two-letter names designed to inform about the
physical location of name holders. They are on the same level
as gTLDs. With the rise of the value of gTLDs, such as “.com,”
the value of ccTLDs has risen as well. That is because under a
ccTLD, one can create many new (and sometimes known)
gTLDs under its umbrella. ccTLDs are similar to TLDs except
that they are limited to existing political real entities (countries), regardless of how we define them.64
When the value and importance of names and their management was not accompanied by political or economic values,
ccTLDs and their registries — delegates of the power to manage the database of the d omain names under their authority —
were recognized generously.65 For example, IANA, which preceded ICANN, recognized the delegation of a ccTLD to Palestine, and thereafter confirmed a reassignment of the delegation
to other registries.66
64. The argument of whether a country can assert exclusive right to its
name was raised in a United States court. See Virtual Countries, 148 F.
Supp. 2d at 256. The district court did not assert jurisdiction and suggested
that the parties resort to the international arbitration system provided for
disputes concerning domain names. Id. at 268.
65. See JOHN C. KLENSIN, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE ,
REFLECTIONS ON THE DNS, RFC 1591, AND CATEGORIES OF DOMAINS (2000), at
http://public.research.mimesweeper.com/standards/IETF/Draft/draft-klensin1591-reflections -02.txt (describing ccTLDs and gTLDs and the controversies
involving their delegation).
66. To avoid making a political decision, IANA followed a list by ISO 3166
Maintenance Agency, and agreed to the re-delegation of Palestine when Palestine was accorded the status of “Occupied Palestine Territory.” IANA,
IANA REPORT ON REQUEST FOR DELEGATION OF THE .PS T OP LEVEL DOMAIN
(2000), at http://www.icann.org/general/ps-report-22mar00.htm (containing
IANA’s report and analysis which led to the recommendation to approve the
re-delegation). See also International Organization for Standardization, ISO
3166
Maintenance
Agency
(ISO
3166/MA),
at
http://www.din.de/gremien/nas/nabd/iso3166ma (last visited Apr. 20, 2002)
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The use of ccTLDs varies. In some countries, they are used as
gTLDs that have a similar name as the country’s name. In
other countries, they represent a political geography.67 Some
countries have privatized (sold) their ccTLDs, as the U.S. government is considering doing.68 Other countries deem the registries of ccTLDs to be the delegates of the governments and under their control.
2. The Dispute over ccTLD “.au” Between the Registry and the
Australian Government
In 1986, Professor Robert Elz received from Dr. Po stel the
delegated authority over the registry of Australia’s ccTLD —
“.au.” Even though the registry had the power to create second level domains, such as “.com.au” and “.net.au,”69 Professor Elz
seemed to believe that the main Internet services should not be
commercial.70 No commercial use also meant no value for the
(describing the complete list of country names and ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 code
elements — the ISO country code used on the Internet).
67. See POSTEL , supra note 22, at 1. Part of this description has changed
with the years. The principles, however, remained the same. See ICANN,
ICP-1: INTERNET DOMAIN N AME S YSTEM S TRUCTURE AND DELEGATION (1999), at
http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-1.htm [hereinafter ICP-1] (describing ICANN’s
administration practices, and noting that IANA has remained the overall
authority for day-to-day administration of the naming system, intellectual
property addresses, autonomous system numbers and TLDs, and other aspects of the system). The document includes the source where the “procedures
to be followed in requesting TLD delegations or changes” can be found. Id.
The document contains the qualification requirements for TLD managers.
Id.
68. See NAT ’L TELECOMMS. AND INFO. ADMIN., T HE DIGITAL O PPORTUNITY
TRUST : T HE DOT IN .US, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/
usrfc2/comments.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (proposing an elaborate
plan to manage “.us” for the benefit of all U.S. citizens); Commerce Department Poised to Accept Bids for .us, NAT ’L J. TECH . D AILY , June 1, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. See also ICANN Watch, More on the
.us Solicitation, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=208 (June 14,
2001).
69. See Kate Mackenzie, Domains Taken from Elz, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 5,
2002, at 29; Multimedia Seeks .au Registry, AUSTRALIAN FI N. REV ., Dec. 3,
2001, at 42 (Professor Elz assigned the “.au” rights to a “commercial spin-off”
of Melbourne University – Melbourne IT) [hereinafter Domains Taken from
Elz].
70. It seems that Professor Elz controlled more than the database containing the current domain name holders. See Kirsty Needham, Australian Government to Take Over Domain Names, S YDNEY M ORNING HERALD, Jan. 22,
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names. Consequently, “Australia has never had a cybersquatting problem like the United States has.”71 No one compiles
names for sale.
The government of Australia, however, has different priorities, planning a far more aggressive commercial development of
the Internet,72 as well as tighter government control over domestic Internet use.73 It established the authority “auDA,” 74
and required Professor Elz to re-delegate the registry’s functions to this authority. The re-delegation of the “.au” space
would also affect the sub-domains.75 Professor Elz agreed to redelegate, but it appeared unlikely that he would do so until
certain conditions had been met.76 A year later, the redelegation had still not taken place.77 On June 13, 2001, a news
headline stated: Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer Hangs on to Keys
to Web.78 Interestingly, Professor Elz was deemed not to have
2001, at 35 (noting that the government agency bought a database of all domain names registered in Australia).
71. Kirsty Needham, Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer Hangs on to Keys to Web,
S YDNEY M ORNING HERALD, June 13, 2001, at 25, available at
http://old.smh.com.au/news/0106/13/biztech/biztech3.html [hereinafter Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer].
72. National Office for the Information Economy, Reforming .au Domain
Name Administration, at http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/information%
5Feconomy/domains%5Fau/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (The website notes that government recognition of “effective administration of the .au
domain space” is “important to the development of e-commerce in Australia.”).
73. See ICANN Watch, AUDA Seeks ICANN’s Help to Force .au Redelegation, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=197 (June 6, 2001) [hereinafter ICANN’s Help] (the Australian authority suggests that Professor Elz’s
administration had been slow, but did not allege any wrongdoing).
74. James Riley, New Board Set Up for Domain Rule, AUSTRALIAN, Apr.
27, 1999, at 49, 49.
75. See Push for Name Controls, AGE (Melbourne), Mar. 7, 2000, at 1 (“The
policy and administration of the .au domain would affect the sub-domains.”).
76. Dot.au Domain Name Registration Gets Nasty, BUS . REV . WEEKLY
(Australia), May 19, 2000, at 44 (The article states that it was “unlikely Elz
[would] relinquish his authority until auDA [had] secured the confidence of
the industry and [was] endorsed by the National Office for the Information
Economy.”).
77. For a precedent by which IANA redelegated a ccTLD of an island of
forty-nine residents, with the support of all but two of its adult inhabitants,
see Jeri Clausing, Pacific Islands Seek Control of Internet Designations, N.Y.
TIMES , Feb. 14, 2000, at C1. See also Sableman, supra note 51.
78. Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer, supra note 71, at 25 (“[Professor Elz] refused to relinquish his historic guardianship, flatly ignoring requests from
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responded to the government’s request — “just not doing anything” — rather than refused the request.79 The government
viewed this distinction as “relatively important.”80 In September 2001, ICANN announced that it had awarded control of the
“.au” domain to auDA.81 However, Elz refused to release the
“.org.au” and “.id.au” second-level domains, and they were
seized from him in February 2002.82
The power relationship between a sovereign country, the registry of its name and ICANN is unclear. ICANN and IANA
published the relevant information in 1999,83 yet the power
relationship is being established by actions rather than by
words and rules. Arguably, a country should be entitled to its
own name. But if the name has been assigned by a private body
and used by a private individual, then presumably it cannot be
the property of a government.84 The entitlement to the names
is a subject worthy of a separate paper.85 The important and
interesting point for the purpose of this Article is the fact that
the government of Australia approached ICANN for help.86 Afthe Federal Government to pass control of the country’s Internet addressing
system to a new regulatory body. . . . The clash is one of the last stand-offs
between the old school of the Internet and the commercial interests that now
dominate it.”).
79. Id.
80. Kate Mackenzie, Tough Call on Names for ICANN, A USTRALIAN, June
26, 2001, at 33, 33.
81. See Kevin Murphy, ICANN Hands .au Domain to Aussie Non-Profit,
COMPUTER WIRE , Sept. 5, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
82. See Domains Taken from Elz, supra note 69, at 29.
83. ICP-1, supra note 67. On transfer and disputes over delegation of
TLDs, IANA should receive communications from both parties. It takes no
action until the parties agree, noting that “it is far better when the parties
can reach an agreement” because of the time it would otherwise take and
that “it is appropriate for interested parties to have a voice in the selection of
the designated manager.” Id.
84. See Kate Mackenzie, Domain Standoff Tests ICANN, AUSTRALIAN IT
(June 21, 2001) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Domain Standoff].
85. See id. (suggesting that sovereign countries should have control over
their names and over the registries, but if the names are used as gTLDs, with
the consent of the governments, the names should be treated as such).
86. See Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer, supra note 71 (The representative of
the government “has written to the Internet’s governing body, the International [sic] Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, requesting his
organisation be recognised as the peak Internet body in Australia, not Mr
Elz.”); Domain Standoff, supra note 84 (noting that such an application is
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ter all, Professor Elz was an Australian resident and perhaps
an Australian citizen. The government could have introduced a
bill that would have required the redelegation. It perhaps could
have imposed a fine by law or used eminent domain over the
ccTLD to requisition the name and appoint its own delegate. It
took none of these steps. Instead it sought ICANN’s interve ntion in the matter.87 Other countries have taken another route.
They have asserted their power over the management of their
ccTLD, and passed laws to give the assertion real teeth.88
These steps, however, do not weaken ICANN, though they do
not strengthen it either.
3. The Rebellion of the ccTLD Registries
The registries of ccTLDs relate in various ways to the governments of the countries to which they provide access, and
these differences are reflected in relationships between the
ccTLD registries and ICANN. A number of small countries
have allowed registries, for a fee, to use their ccTLDs for commercial purposes, like gTLDs.89 These registries act and relate
“virtually unprecedented” in that the delegate is refusing the redelegation
and that the other application for redelegation involved Pitcairn Island).
87. See ICANN’s Help, supra note 73 (administrators of ccTLDs who have
not been “designated managers” in the database of IANA have sought
ICANN’s redelegation but were denied the request, except for Canada). What
would prevent the government of the Ukraine from taking such steps if the
registry were stationed in the Ukraine? See Julia Barton, Ukraine’s Domain
in Dot-Dispute, WIRED NEWS (June 22, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,44012,00.html.
88. Early in March 2002, the South African government proposed legislation, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Bill, which would
nationalize the administration of its ccTLD “.za.” If enacted, the law would
prohibit any organization from continuing its operation as a “.za” administrator. See Bill on Internet Due Soon, supra note 63; Cyber Cops to Ensure Safe
Surfing, supra note 63 (noting that the bill was tabled in March 2002). The
government of Ireland has also taken steps to assert its jurisdiction over the
administration of its ccTLD. See Denis Kelleher, Cybersquatters’ Rights Go
West Under New Laws, IRISH TIMES , May 15, 2000, at 8 (noting that legislation would allow the Minister of Public Enterprise to control rules governing
domain name registration in Ireland); Karlin Lillington, Digital Gesture by
President Makes History, IRISH TIMES , July 11, 2000, at 16 (noting passage of
legislation).
89. See, e.g., IANA, IANA REPORT ON REQUEST FOR REDELEGATION OF THE
.PN T OP-LEVEL DOMAIN (2000), available at http://www.icann.org/general/pnreport-11feb00.htm (Pitcairn Island); ICANN Watch, VeriSign Buzzes with
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to the system and to ICANN as registries of gTLDs do. They
have signed contracts with ICANN as required, and pay registration fees. But these registries are a minuscule minority of
the 240 ccTLD registries. The others, such as those serving
France, Germany and the U.K., are generally the designates of
the governments of those countries, and the governments assert the right to re-delegate the management of the ccTLDs to
others. Generally, as between the registries and the governments this is not an issue, and the registries consider the mselves as an arm of their governments to further their governments’ political and social policies.
Although these registries have been paying ICANN dues that
cover about a third of ICANN’s budget, many have not signed
ICANN’s contracts. Because they are not uniform in their functions and relationships to their governments, and because
ICANN does not service all registries, a standard contract does
not fit all of them. The text of these contracts has been negotiated for some time, and a number of contract models have been
developed both for those registries that ICANN services and
those that it does not.90 In the process, feathers have been ruffled. In one case, ICANN has written to their governments, and
this letter has raised the ire of the registries because some
have interpreted the language to invite a review of the registries’ performance.91 In sum, ICANN’s relationship with many
the .bz Biz(ness), at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=185 (May 31,
2001); .NU, .NU Domain /IUS-N Mission, at http://www.nunames.nu/
about/about.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002); The .tv Corporation, About Us, at
http://www.tv/en-def-e9763cedc23f/en/about/about_ company_overview.shtml?
Hhtype=content6/20/01 (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
90. For a draft of a contract between ICANN and ccTLD registries, see
ICANN, CENTR Draft Contract for Services, at http://www.icann.org/
cctlds/centr-7th-draft-contract-20sep00.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). For a
draft of a proposed unsponsored TLD agreement with ICANN, dated September 21, 2001, see ICANN, Proposed Unsponsored TLD Agreement, at
http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/unsponsored/registry-agmt-26apr01.ht
m (Apr. 26, 2001). For a discussion draft of a ccTLD Manager-ICANN
“Status Quo” Agreement, see ICANN, Discussion Draft of ccTLD ManagerICANN “Status-Quo” Agreement, at http://www.icann.org/yokohama/draftcctld-status -quo-agreement-05jul00.htm (July 5, 2000); William New, Net
Governance: ICANN Nears Deal on Country-Specific Domains, NAT ’L J.
TECH . D AILY, Mar. 12, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. See
also Revolt Threatens ICANN’s Budget, supra note 43.
91. See ICANN, Discussion Draft of Letter to Governments Regarding
ccTLD
Managers,
at
http://www.icann.org/cctlds/draft-letter-to-govts-
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of these registries has not yet been formalized, and the task is
formidable.92
Historically, both ICANN and the ccTLD registries have
adopted a “hands off” approach towards each other’s activities.
That has changed as ICANN sought to formalize its relationship with these registries — establishing controlling measures
over them — and the registries demanded a greater role in
ICANN and its policy decision making.93 This is significant.
The registries did not repudiate or question ICANN’s authority. On the contrary, they demanded a greater voice in its
power structure, that is, they demanded membership on its
board.94 The latest proposed structure of ICANN might resolve
the issue. ccTLDs or their governments will pay dues to
ICANN. The governments will occupy a board seat, however,
and that might satisfy the demand for a greater voice in
ICANN’s government. ICANN’s power as an entity will then be
augmented by further support and money.
4. The Three Events Demonstrate ICANN’s Increasing Power
The three events described above differ. One involves a dispute between a sovereign state and a registry of its ccTLD. The
second is a dispute is between ccTLD registries, the DNSO and
12nov00.htm (Nov. 12, 2000); Mark Ward, Name Row Threatens the Net, BBC
NEWS
(Nov.
28,
2000),
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
sci/tech/newsid_1043000/1043509.stm.
92. See Sticky Issues, supra note 50; Sableman, supra note 51.
93. Juliana Gruenwald, Domain Group Revolts Against ICANN, at
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2767690.html
(May
31,
2001); Andrew Orlowski, Country Domain Chiefs Prefer Jaw-Jaw to WarWar, REGISTER (June 14, 2001), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/ content/6/19712.html.
94. ICANN’s relationship to the registry of “.us” is unclear, as is the fate of
the ccTLD. It is likely, however, that whoever wins the bid on this ccTLD will
have to conform to ICANN’s policies. See ICANN Watch, More on the .us
Solicitation, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=208 (last visited
Apr. 21, 2002). But see Brian Kahin, Making Policy by Solicitation: The Outsourcing of .us, at http://icannwatch.org/essays/kahin.htm (July 16, 2001)
(suggesting that the winning contractor will determine policies and criticizing
the current proposal to auction “.us”). While prior to 1999, IANA determined
policy and NSI acted as a registry and performed the registration, after 1999,
the policy function shifted to ICANN. NSI continued as a registry and registration became competitive, supervised by ICANN. It seems that under this
plan, if ICANN is not the supervisor of the contract operator, it would be
losing some of its hegemony.
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ICANN. The third case represents a disagreement between
ICANN and an aspiring ccTLD registry. All three events demonstrate recognition of ICANN’s power to determine the existence and nature of ccTLDs, and the power to affect, at least by
qualifications and imposition of fees, the identity and functions
of the registries of these ccTLDs. The Australian government
applied to ICANN to determine its dispute with the existing
registry of its ccTLD.95 Professor Elz may have implied
ICANN’s power to select or qualify registries because indirectly
he based his rights on Dr. Postel’s appointment rather than on
the appointment by his government. The ccTLD registries felt
that the DNSO, to which these registries belonged, did not represent the registries’ interests. Therefore, the registries left the
DNSO, but did not leave ICANN. Instead they demanded a
more prominent place in its organization: a separate supporting organization and the right to appoint, select or recommend
directors to its board.96 The registries were critical of ICANN’s
operating practices but not of ICANN “as an organization.”97
The registries argued that there should be “no taxation without
representation.”98 The use of these words is revealing. The
power to tax is governmental; the right to representation is
that of the citizen. It is unclear, however, whether the registries placed themselves in the position of citizens and ICANN
— in the position of a government. That is because the registries viewed their payments as fees for specific services and not
95. See ICANN’s Help, supra note 73.
96. See Laura Rohde, Defections at ICANN’s Support Organization,
INDUSTRY S TANDARD. COM , June 4, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group
File [hereinafter Defections]; European Domains Want ICANN’s Attention,
supra note 50. For the language of the registries’ resolution, see WorldWide
Alliance of Top Level Domain Names, Executive Summary of ccTLD Stockholm Meeting on 31 May and 1 June 2001, at http://www.wwtld.org/meetings/cctld/Stockholm2001/Executive_summary_.01June2001.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002). Arguably, not all registries were of the same mind. Of
the over 250 registries, only thirty-one voted to make the demand and take
the action. However, the others did not object nor abstain, but simply did not
take part in the process. See Ward, supra note 91.
97. Defections, supra note 96.
98. Id. See also Mark Ward, Net Groups in World Wide Wrangle, BBC
NEWS
(July
4,
2000),
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
sci/tech/newsid_817000/ 817657.stm (stating that the registries believe that
the costs levied on them stem from legal costs of ICANN’s dealing with NSI,
and refuse to pay for costs over which they had no control).
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as financing the operations of ICANN generally. But perhaps
they only meant that if they financed ICANN’s operations they
ought to have a say about the way the money is spent. In any
event, the registries recognized ICANN as the regulator of the
ccTLDs, both by explicitly mentioning their recognition and by
demanding greater power in the organization.
5. The Position of the U.S. Department of Commerce
On June 25, 2001, the DOC responded to a request by Mr.
William H. Bode on behalf of Atlantic Root Network, Inc. (“Atlantic”). Atlantic was concerned about ICANN’s process in selecting new TLDs. The DOC stated in part:
In July 1998, the Department of Commerce made it clear
that it would not participate in the selection process of new
TLDs as set forth in the Statement of Policy, entitled Management of Internet Names and Addresses. . . . In the Statement of Policy, the Department recognized that the selection
of new TLDs should be conducted by the private sector
through a not-for-profit organization, globally representative
of the Internet stakeholder community. The Department recognized ICANN as that organization in November 1998
through a Memorandum of Understanding.
We note that at its May 2001 board of directors meeting,
ICANN approved the establishment of a New TLD Evaluation
Process Planning Task Force (Task Force) ro [sic] monitor the
implementation process and to evaluate the selection process
of the new TLDs. The ICANN board resolution stated that the
Task Force will make recommendations to the ICANN board
and the Internet community regarding the selection process.
It is our understanding that the Task Force will allow public
input when formulating its recommendations. We encourage
you to participate in this opportunity. In a recent letter to
ICANN, the Department encouraged ICANN to move forward
in the selection of new TLDs in order to increase competition
in the domain name space.
Again, we encourage you to direct Atlantic Root Network’s
concern regarding ICANN’s selection process directly to
ICANN.
Sincerely,
[Signed]
John F. Sopko
Acting Assistant Secretary for
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The letter speaks for itself, making it clear that the U.S. supports ICANN in this matter, and recognizes ICANN’s power
most explicitly. The government encouraged the complainant to
apply to ICANN. It is not surprising that the only party that
did not concede ICANN’s power was the aspiring rejected registry.
6. The Latest Move to Restructure
The latest move of ICANN’s staff to restructure demo nstrates how the institution is reaching for power. The proposal
would greatly minimize constraints over the board and the
staff. It would eliminate nine publicly elected directors and
substitute for them fewer — (five) — representatives of go vernments reflecting the five regions of the globe.100 Thus, each
of ICANN’s board members will represent specific identified
interests, and will be selected by these interests. Governments
will presumably ensure that ICANN will be better endowed
and staffed. If this proposal is put into effect and if it works,
ICANN will become stronger. At the same time, if its members
contain each other’s claims to hegemony, its overall powers
may remain in check.
IV. BOUNDARIES OF POWER
A. Contestable Markets Theory
The introduction to this Article describes the theory of contestable markets. ICANN’s circumstances (from its first birthday to its third birthday) bring to mind this theory and help
explain ICANN’s evolution. In fact, the inadequacies of the
theory in the markets context are less pronounced in the context of power. I assume that the stability of the Internet requires the existence of a single root. I further assume that if
99. Letter from John F. Sopko, Acting Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, U.S. Department of Commerce, to William H. Bode,
Partner, Bode & Beckman, LLP (June 25, 2001), quoted in ICANN Watch,
Commerce Dept: We Don’t Do TLDs, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=237&mode=nested&order=0 (July 8, 2001).
100. See P RESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 7.

4/20/02 9:44:21 AM

896

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. XXVII:3

more than one manager manages the root, the financial and
social costs of the Internet would rise. The two cooks will spoil
the broth. Therefore, the structure of the Internet naming and
numbering system mandates a single manager — a natural
monopolist. I assume further that there is no superpower that
regulates ICANN. The question is whether this monopoly will
result in an excessive exercise of power, similar to excessive
charges that a monopolist would extort from consumers.
B. The Nature of the Market for Power
The market that is discussed here is the market for mana ging the numbering and naming system. While in the business
market competitors seek rents represented mostly by money,
the rents from the power of ICANN are varied. These rents include the ability of the power holder to ensure the stability of
the Internet and the integrity of the naming and numbering
system. The power holder can guard over the technical integrity of the system, or maintain and expand the value of its investments in the current system as registry or ISP. The power
holder can control the system for political reasons or protect
one’s trademarks by freezing or reducing the number of additional upper-level d omain names.
Potential competitors may be interested in social benefits,
and the stronger they are as potential competitors, the greater
is ICANN’s constraint on its power to conflict with these social
benefits. These self-interested goals cannot be achieved unilaterally because the Internet is dependent on the support and
actions of many others with other agendas (e.g., governments,
legislatures and different ISPs). They must all agree to the
management’s edicts. By their consent to ICANN they can
achieve their own self-interested objectives, at least to an acceptable degree.101 It is the management power and its lawmaking capabilities that are the product in this market.102
101. ICANN’s power and the power of money are similar. Both are a store
of value through which other objectives can be achieved. In fact, these are two
different aspects of freedom and coercion. It is important to note that the
purpose for which power is held is not the topic here. Power, like money, can
be obtained voluntarily by consent from others, and usually in an exchange.
Power, like money, can also be obtained from others by violence and extortion. The use of money, however, is generally more limited than the use of
power. Money can be used coercively if it is necessary to obtain values (as-
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The power for which there is a market in this case is of two
kinds. One relates to particular actions in the exercise of management and lawmaking — “specific power.” The other is the
power to take over all the managerial and lawmaking activities
— “general power.” Firms that produce a number of related
products can “cross-subsidize” their products and thereby block
market entry to competitors that produce only one type of
product. Arguably, like business corporations, ICANN can
cross-subsidize one type of special power by another type of
special power. For example, it can subsidize qualification requirements for other less stringent contract terms. However,
many of ICANN’s potential competitors, such as governments,
are also multi-product firms in this sense. They too can subsidize one special power by another. The difference between
these potential competitors and ICANN is in their institutional
structure. As compared to ICANN, they have limited powers
outside their territories but greater power within their territories. Even ISPs have some multi-product capabilities and can
cross-subsidize. Thus, ICANN’s competitors seem to be
stronger than one-product business competitors.
C. The Competitors that Present a Constraining Force to the
Monopolist
Under the contestable markets theory, competitors who can
constrain the monopolist are those whose sunken costs are
similar to the monopolist’s sunken costs. Sunken costs for a
general power are the costs of establishing a broad supporting
coalition to take over ICANN’s general power or at least to create a credible threat of such a possible takeover. Thus, if the
members of ICANN’s current supporting coalition were dissatisfied with the existing ICANN and had sufficient power to
establish a different entity, they would present a formidable
sets) which other persons want. The person who has bread and would not
part with it except through money has power over the hungry person. Yet
this power is based on the possession of the bread, not the money.
102. ICANN’s power can be analogized to the power of other managers and
the market for chief executive officers. They compete for the position of managers by obtaining the consent (or at least the passive non-intervention) of
shareholders, nominators, existing top management, unions and perhaps
others that wield power in the corporation. Or they may only receive the support of the nominators. They do, however, have competitors. Their market is
small, though not a monopoly. But it may be sufficiently small to resemble a
contestable market.
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tablish a different entity, they would present a formidable
threat to ICANN’s existence, and could force it to restructure or
comply in other ways.
Alternatively, if a coalition of other competitors is sufficiently
strong to convince the actors in the Internet infrastructure to
cease following ICANN’s instruction and the single root, the
possibility and existence of such a coalition would deter ICANN
from exercising any power in a way that would displease this
coalition. In February 2002, I believed that this scenario is
unlikely. Today, that may not be the case. As the management
of ICANN proposed a new structure, Dr. David Farber, a respected academic who was involved in the design of the naming
and numbering system, and others have raised the possibility
of removing the powers of ICANN to another technical organization. In fact, the proposal would resurrect some of Dr. Postel’s hegemony.103
Another scenario that is unique to the Internet is the possible addition of new names through existing ISPs. I consider
this scenario a threat of competitors of specific power, not ge neral power. The competitors’ investment or sunken costs in the
market for specific power are the costs of establishing a coalition aimed at the specific power, or a credible threat to the exercise (or non-exercise) of that specific power. As in the case of
the commercial markets, the market for power, in which
ICANN operates, is populated by different actors with different
entry costs. They may exert political power, form coalitions or
offer rich revenues. Their sunken costs need not be higher than
ICANN’s entry costs, or may be lower, especially in the case of
special powers.
The exit costs of such competitors should be close to zero if
their investments can be used elsewhere. However, once a
power structure is established, the very loss of the power is not
a zero loss even if the coalition can continue to exist and flex its
muscle, for example, by entering ICANN’s power structure. The
investment in creating a competitor to ICANN may be high,
because the powerful interests that are potential competitors
conflict, and the competitors would be successful only if they
find a better way to complement their interests than the one
103. See ICANN “A Failure” Says ICANN, NEWSWIRE (VNU), Mar. 19, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
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found by ICANN.104 Otherwise, potential competitors would
enter the market only if ICANN exerts a higher degree of
power than they would together. If ICANN increases or extends its power, competitors may invest in entering the market
to enjoy the benefits of the greater power until it will dilute by
the mere existence of the competition. Then they will exit, as
the exit costs are not high for them.
D. Differences Between Business and Power Markets
One difference between the business market and the power
market is that potential competitors can constrain ICANN’s
power exercise not only by threatening to assert their own
claims to power, but also by withdrawing their support of
ICANN. A monopolist in the business market does not need the
support of its competitors — he receives the support from the
consumers. A monopolist in the power market may need that
support, and ICANN needs it. Withdrawal involves no direct
cost to competitors, but it may be very costly if it undermines
ICANN and produces a worse alternative.105
Further, while in the business market competitors threaten
to offer a competing product, in the power market competitors
can threaten to exert power with respect to one special “power
product.” If ICANN attempts to exercise power that competitors deem to provide “higher rents,” these competitors may enter the market, but only in the area requiring low — or no —
investment (they already have the power), and where exit is
costless (they will exercise the power elsewhere), while the
benefit from entry provides high rents. It is harder in the
power market to calculate a quantifiable price in terms of
power that a monopolist should “charge.” Even in the business
104. While outsiders who wish to get into the ISP and registry business and
increase the number of domain names may try to form such a coalition, they
will have to overcome the power of the governments and those who would
oppose the extension, as well as those who would be concerned about the
stability of the Internet. Thus, it may well be that those who wish to enter
the field with two roots will have higher costs than those who would wish to
replace ICANN with one root only.
105. ICANN may refrain from exercising its power, for example, to establish additional domain names opening the doors to new businesses. Potential
competitors may form coalitions to overcome the inaction, and ICANN may
take steps to stymie their efforts.
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market this determination has raised a debate. In the power
market one can only speculate.
E. When Competitors Will Cooperate
The contestable market theory is not helpful to predict
ICANN’s evolution if its competitors cooperate, and this possibility is not negligible. Presumably, cooperation among the
competitors should be encouraged. It is then renamed a consensus. In fact, the proposed restructure of ICANN seems to be
heading towards such a coalition and power sharing. A broad based participation within ICANN signifying a broad -based
consensus could lend ICANN legitimacy. Its monopoly power
will be constrained from within, as the different interests negotiate. To this extent, ICANN may resemble a policy-making
legislative body.
However, legislatures are elected. ICANN is a not-for-profit
organization. The power of elected bodies is bestowed on them
by the votes. Therefore, elected members must account for their
actions to those who bestowed the power on them — the voters.
The assets of a not-for-profit corporation are donated usually
by its directors (or the directors’ designates). They exercise
their management power with a sense of entitlement that their
donations give them. Theirs is not a legal duty to account to
others; theirs is a duty to account to their conscience. This is
ICANN’s deepest and most serious dilemma.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article focused on balance of power and structure. It
said very little about the crucial component of legitimacy. An
organization that lacks clear support of law in a country, lacks
a vote of a democratic body politic, lacks a theoretical following
of professionals and lacks a popular trust is vulnerable. It is
unclear whether political strategies and machinations will sustain it for long. What this Article discusses is another form of
sustenance that does not depend on legitimacy but on raw containment of power. Such containment may not be long-term
because the actions of the participants are based on selfinterest rather than self-governing principles. Its power does
not rest on the rule of consensus except the consensus to rule.
Whether this base will be sufficient for longe vity remains to be
seen. On the other hand, if ICANN becomes a platform for ne-
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gotiations among the interested parties, and in time facilitates
the deve lopment of acceptable rules and consensus, it will have
become a most impressive and unique success.
In a very insightful book, Ruling the Waves, Debora L. Spar
suggests that significant innovations pass through four
stages.106 They first introduce chaos.107 Next, from the chaos
there emerge rules and some patterns of behavior.108 Eventually, these patterns form institutions.109 Finally, and surprisingly, the institutions begin to look and behave as familiar institutions serving the same purposes through and with the aid
of the new technology.110 ICANN may be a very good test case
for this prediction. The naming and numbering system has
passed through a chaotic stage, emerging as ICANN with rules
that are resisted in part, and evolving into an institution. The
last stage of “globalization” and the Internet naming system
may be grounded in the states or federations of states representing the political systems. Accountability, community values
and public interest will return to their rightful position. Business and technical interests will find their voice, but it will not
be the dominant voice. We may thus return to the basic form of
civic organization, adding to it the Internet service with sufficient links to the rest of the world. Then we could say that
there is nothing new under the sun.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See S PAR , supra note 4, at 11-22.
See id. at 11-12.
See id. at 12-15.
See id. at 15-18.
See id. at 18-22.

